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A B S T R A C T
The role of socio-political power is central to the development of policy, but systematic analyses of power
associated with the development of energy policy are rare. Power is also an important yet somewhat under-
researched aspect of socio-technical transitions research. The Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) policy aims to
increase deployment of low-carbon heat in Great Britain and begin a transformation to a low carbon GB heat
system. This article analyses the socio-political power associated with the development of the RHI policy based
on Lukes' ‘dimensions of power’ approach using a methodology based on triangulation. We identify a number of
policy change episodes during the development of the RHI and describe the influence of key actors on the policy.
Despite the common assumption of the power of incumbents, we show that those actors with niche technological
expertise, close relationships with Government actors and actors within the administration have been the most
powerful drivers of policy development and change. Niche actors sped up the introduction of the RHI scheme
and have also had some success in increasing relative support for biomethane injection. The power of a civil
servant to slow the introduction of the domestic element of the RHI has also been identified.
1. Introduction
The UK heat sector has historically received limited attention from
both policy makers and scholars. Recently, however, the focus on heat
policy has increased.
The current reliance on fossil fuels for heat (shown in Fig. 1) means
that heat use accounts for a third of the UK's total GHG emissions
(POST, 2016) and therefore current UK heating practices are in-
compatible with the UK's commitments under the Climate Change Act
2008 which requires the UK to reduce its GHG emissions by 80%
compared to 1990 levels by 2050. The Act implies the transformation of
the UK's national energy system, including electricity, transport, and
heat. The Government, its independent statutory climate change ad-
visor and others suggest that eliminating greenhouse gas emissions and
the associated use of fossil fuels from space heating will be required if
the UK is to meet its 2050 obligations (Carbon Connect, 2014;
Committee on Climate Change, 2015; DECC, 2012a).
The UK is also required to provide 15% of its energy from renewable
sources by 2020 under the European Union's Renewable Energy
Directive (DECC, 2009). The UK Government anticipates that this will
require around 12% of heat sourced from renewables by 2020 (HM
Government, 2009), a major increase from the 2015 level of 5.6%
(DECC, 2016).
Further still, the UK became a net importer of gas in 2000, and
increasing import dependency means that around half of all gas is now
imported (DECC, 2015a). Only very strong production growth of new
sources of gas can reverse this trend (National Grid, 2016). Relying on
natural gas imports also leaves the UK vulnerable to shifts in gas prices
and its availability on the international market.
These factors have combined to increase the focus on the heat sector
and the ways in which policy can encourage the adoption of low carbon
heat technologies. In an attempt to drive the depolyment of renewable
heating and develop a low carbon heat market, the UK Government
introduced the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) in 2011. The politics
and socio-political power associated with the development of the RHI is
the subject of this article.
Socio-political power has long been acknowledged as an important
factor in the development of public policy (Hay, 2002; Kingdon, 2010;
Sabatier, 1998; Weible et al., 2012). However, scholarly research con-
cerning the transformation of large socio-technical systems has tended
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T
to overlook the importance of socio-political power (Meadowcroft,
2011, 2009; Shove and Walker, 2010, 2007).
In the UK context, specific concerns about lobbying and political
transparency in the UK have been recently highlighted, with the in-
troduction of the UK's 2014 ‘Lobbying Act’ which had the aim of
making UK politics ‘more transparent’ and for the first time registering
lobbyists (HM Government, 2012, p3).
This article explores the role of socio-political power in the creation
and early development of the Great Britain1 (GB) RHI policy between
2008 and 2014. It considers the interaction and power-relations of
businesses, trade associations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
and civil servants and examines the influence of these actors on the
development of the policy by considering three research questions:
1. How has the RHI been affected by socio-political power?
2. How have actors attempted to influence the RHI?
3. What are the implications of this influence for the GB transforma-
tion to low-carbon heating?
This research contributes to the literature on lobbying and its in-
fluence on energy policy as well as that addressing socio-technical
transitions.
The article is structured as follows: section 2 describes the in-
troduction of the RHI scheme, in section 3 we set out how we con-
ceptualise power in the context of socio-technical transitions and en-
ergy policy. In section 4, we describe the methodology. In section 5, we
present our analysis. In section 6, we discuss our results our key theo-
retical and methodological contributions, finally, we state our conclu-
sions and the implications for policy in section 7.
2. The RHI and performance to date
This section briefly describes the history and design of the RHI and
evaluates its performance (for a more detailed review see Connor et al.
(2015)).
The introduction of the RHI is the first significant change to heat
policy in the UK since the mandating of condensing boilers in 2003
(Department for Trade and Industry, 2003). The ‘Clear Skies’ pro-
gramme (2003–2006) and ‘Low-carbon Buildings Programme’
(2006–2010) delivered some renewable heat capacity such as biomass
and solar thermal through grant payments (Connor et al., 2015).
However, these schemes were small-scale and short-term and did not
explicitly target renewable heat deployment.
In 2008, the UK Government proposed several options for renew-
able heat support (BERR, 2008a). These included an obligation for re-
newable heat or a tariff-based incentive mechanism (BERR, 2008b). At
the end of 2008, the legislation for a tariff-based incentive mechanism
to support renewable heat which came to be known as the RHI was
introduced alongside legislation for the Feed In Tariff (FIT) which
supported small scale renewable electricity generation (Parliament,
2008a).
Following the 2010 general election, there were uncertainties over
how the RHI would be funded but in October that year it was an-
nounced that funding would be made available to for the RHI (HM
Treasury, 2010).
The RHI opened for non-domestic applications in November 2011.
The non-domestic RHI policy provides qualifying new renewable heat
installations with a fixed payment per unit of energy for 20 years
(DECC, 2011a). The initial non-domestic tariffs and initially eligible
technologies are shown in Table 1.
The implementation of the domestic RHI scheme was delayed
(further details of this delay are considered in section 5.3) and in 2011
an interim policy called the Renewable Heat Premium Payment’
(RHPP) was introduced. THE RHPP provided capital grants for air
source and ground source heat pumps, solar thermal systems and bio-
mass boilers and was taken up by around 15,000 households (DECC,
2014a). The domestic RHI eventually opened in Spring 2014 and re-
wards homeowners who generate renewable heat with a fixed tariff for
seven years (DECC, 2013a). Technologies supported by the domestic
RHI include biomass boilers, heat pumps and solar thermal. The tariffs
at the time of the scheme's introduction are shown in Table 2 (in section
5.4) where they form an important aspect of one of the policy episodes.
There has been very limited academic discussion or analysis of the
RHI. The work which exists has evaluated the expected deployment of
solar thermal technologies in advance of the scheme (Abu-Bakar et al.,
2014, 2013) and has also used agent based modelling to consider heat
pump uptake (Snape et al., 2015). In both cases, it was suggested higher
tariffs were needed to drive technology deployment.
As shown in Fig. 2, accreditations for biomass heating systems have
dominated the non-domestic RHI every quarter since it opened al-
though the share of additional biomass capacity has reduced recently.
The original Government impact assessment for the policy suggested
that heat from biomass was expected to contribute to around 49% of
heat supported by the RHI (DECC, 2011b). However many more bio-
mass boilers have been delivered than was initially suggested in the RHI
impact assessment (DECC, 2011b). Over the course on the non-domestic
RHI, 76% of the total heat delivered by the scheme has been delivered
through biomass combustion (based on BEIS, (2017b) statistics).
Fig. 2 also includes biomethane site accrediations under the RHI but
because of the relatively large scale and small number of these sites, the
growth of biomethane is not shown clearly. Similar to biomass, bio-
methane has also contributed to a significant proportion of the RHI's
total renewable heat deployment. By December 2018, biomethane ac-
counted for over 22% of the heat delivered by the scheme (BEIS, 2018b)
which compares to the 7% suggested as likely uptake in the early
government impact assessment (DECC, 2011b).
Fig. 32 shows the monthly number of accreditations for new in-
stallations under the domestic RHI. For every month of the first year of
the scheme, by far the largest number of new installations were biomass
boilers. However, the impact assessment produced by the Government
Fig. 1. Fuels used for estimated UK heat use in 2017 (BEIS, 2018a).
1 Great Britain includes England, Scotland and Wales but not Northern
Ireland. Energy Policy for Northern Ireland is a fully devolved matter and is not
part of the central UK Government portfolio although the Climate Change Act
Extends to Northern Ireland (HM Government, 2008).
2 Legacy installations which received RHPP grants (installed before April
2014) and then later registered for the RHI have not been included. Due to data
errors, 3 data points for 2014 have been removed but this has had no visual
effect on the graph.
R. Lowes, et al. Energy Policy 131 (2019) 410–421
411
in advance of the domestic RHI scheme suggested that just 9% of ex-
pected installations under the RHI would be biomass boilers, whereas
the largest proportion (46% would be for ASHPs, 25% for solar thermal
and 20% for GSHPs (DECC, 2013b). In light of tariff reductions for
domestic biomass systems throughout 2015, deployment levels of bio-
mass boilers have reduced significantly since then and air source heat
pumps are now the most popular technology under the scheme.
There have been a number of policy changes to the non-domestic
and domestic RHI scheme since their introduction, including:
• The introduction of tariff degression for managing the RHI budget
2013 (DECC, 2013c)• The addition of new technologies and tariff changes for the non-
domestic scheme in 2013 (DECC, 2013d)• A full review of the biomethane tariff in 2014 (DECC, 2014b)• The introduction of ‘sustainability criteria’ for biomass based heat
systems in 2015 (DECC, 2015b)• A review of all tariffs, a simplification of tariff structures and the
introduction of heat consumption limits in 2016 (BEIS, 2016)
We do not set out to evaluate the performance of the RHI. Instead,
we investigate the role of actors and politics in driving the development
of the RHI and policy change up to mid-2015.
3. Power, policy and socio-technical transitions
This section discusses conceptual approaches to the study of power,
its implications for socio-technical transitions and the role of actor
based power on shaping energy policy.
3.1. Conceptualising power
The concept of power is one of the most contested ideas in the social
and political sciences (Arts, 2000). Lukes explains that ‘there is no
agreement about how to define it, how to conceive it, how to study it and, if it
can be measured, how to measure it [power]' (Lukes, 2005, p. 61). Con-
sequently, studying power is inherently challenging.
Normative understandings of the idea of ‘power’ are widespread.
Political actors are often described as being powerful or ‘having power’
and therefore in possession of the ability to influence the policy process.
The study of politics is, in many ways, the study of power (Neumann,
1950).
During the 20th century, various theorists considered what power is
and how it works. For example, Max Weber famously defined power as
‘the opportunity to impose one's will in a social relationship, even against
resistance, without consideration to what this opportunity rests on’ (Weber,
1922). Later, Robert Dahl stated that ‘A has power over B to the extent
Table 1
Non-domestic RHI tariffs at the time of scheme introduction in November 2011 (DECC, 2011a).
Tariff name Eligible technology Eligible sizes Tariff rate (pence/kWh)
Small biomass Solid biomass; Municipal Solid Waste (incl. CHP) Less than 200 kWth Tier 1: 7.6
Tier 2.1.9
Medium biomass 200 kWth and above; less than 1000 kWth Tier 1: 4.7
Tier 2: 1.9
Large biomass 1000 kWth and above 2.6
Small ground source Ground-source heat pumps; Water-source heat pumps; deep geothermal Less than 100 kWth 4.3
Large ground source 100 kWth and above 3
Solar thermal Solar thermal Less than 200 kWth 8.5
Biomethane Biomethane injection and biogas combustion, except from landfill gas Biomethane all scales, biogas combustion less than
200 kWth
6.5
Fig. 2. Quarterly number of applications split by technology under the non-domestic RHI scheme (BEIS, 2018b).
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that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl,
1957, p. 202).
In an attempt to synthesise and consolidate disparate under-
standings of power, and allow the concept of power to be applied, Lukes
developed a conceptual model which comprises three ‘dimensions’ of
power (Lukes, 2005). In this framework:
• The first dimension is the ability of the powerful to coerce another
actor to do something that they would not otherwise have done;• The second dimension is the ability of the powerful to mobilise bias
by controlling what is discussed or setting the agenda;• Lukes' third dimension of power is conceived as being the powerful's
ability to affect others' thoughts or preferences controlling ‘their
perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept
their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or
imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and un-
changeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial’
(Lukes, 2005, p28, p28).
Extending this framework, some authors have suggested that social
and political power has four dimensions. This approach effectively
augments Luke's three dimensions with a ‘fourth dimension’, drawing
on Michel Foucault's conceptualisation of power centred on the in-
stitutionalisation of behaviour and the role of knowledge production
(Digeser, 1992; Haugaard, 2012; Haugaard and Ryan, 2012).
Foucault provides no straightforward means of operationalising this
approach to power (Kendall and Wickham, 1999) but the fourth di-
mension or ‘Foucauldian’ approach places production of knowledge and
the replication of social structures as central aspects (Mills, 2003; Reed,
2013). Applying Foucault's approaches to power to empirical studies is
therefore particularly complex (although attempts have been made e.g
Froud et al. (2017)).
The subtlety of Foucault's work means that in this article we, like
others before us (e.g. Arts and Tatenhove, 2005) focus instead on the
more purposive manifestations of power, employing the three dimen-
sions of power put forward by Lukes (2005) to consider various actors'
roles in the development of the RHI. We investigate whether and how
actors have been able to influence the development of the policy.
3.2. The power of actors and socio-technical transitions
The rapidly growing literature associated with the transformation of
large socio-technical systems takes as its unit of analysis the transition
itself, but does recognise the importance of socio-political power. This
section summaries the treatment of power in transition studies.
Transitions research highlights the importance of actors’ agency
(Shove and Walker, 2007; Smith et al., 2005). In particular, the ex-
pectation that incumbents and existing regime actors to influence and
shape systemic change in their own interests transitions is well docu-
mented (Avelino and Wittmayer, 2016; Geels, 2014, 2011; Grin, 2010;
Hess, 2014; Kemp et al., 2007; Meadowcroft, 2009; Pel, 2015; Smith
et al., 2005).
Small or niche actors have been seen to have the ability to influence
system change (Späth and Rohracher, 2010) but their lack of material,
political and informational resources may limit their power (Avelino,
2009; Kenis et al., 2016). The importance of language, visions and ideas
as well as legitimacy and leadership are also growing in recognition
(Grin, 2010; Meadowcroft, 2009; Smith and Stirling, 2007; Späth and
Rohracher, 2010; Walker and Shove, 2007).
Despite the acknowledged importance of the power, there has been
limited research into the actual role of power in transitions. Existing
work tends to focus explicitly on the role of institutions (Fuenfschilling
and Truffer, 2014; Späth and Rohracher, 2010), incumbents (Kern and
Smith, 2008), path dependency, history, and paradigm change
(Arapostathis et al., 2013; Castán Broto, 2015; Lockwood et al., 2017),
or the proponents of particular technological solutions (Raven et al.,
2016). The focus of much of this work, however, tends to observe the
macro-level implications of power, alongside other factors, on transi-
tions rather than detailed, micro-level observation of power in practice.
By focusing on specific policy change, this article contributes to the
understanding of power in policy development and change at the
micro-level. Its focus on power and public policy and the application of
Fig. 3. Monthly number of installations (accreditations) split by technology under the domestic RHI scheme showing new installations only. Based on BEIS, (2017b)
and (BEIS, 2018b) statistics.
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the three dimensions of power approach builds on specific previous
calls for transitions research, including a focus on how actors can affect
technology diffusion (Genus and Coles, 2008), a greater focus on power
and public policy (Smith et al., 2010), a focus on ideas, interests and
institutions (Meadowcroft, 2011), as well as the application of more
general power theories such as the three dimensions of power approach
(Geels, 2010).
3.3. The power of actors and energy policy
The socio-technical transitions literature highlights the importance
of politics and policy in determining transition trajectories (Hendriks,
2009; Kuzemko, 2013; Meadowcroft, 2011, 2009; Raven et al., 2016).
At the same time, power is central to politics and therefore policy (Hay,
2002). Of particular importance to studies of how policy is made is the
so-called ‘lobbying’ activity of ‘outside’ actors with little or no formal
role in the process, such as interest groups (Kingdon, 2010).
Interest group scholars researching lobbying activity often tend to
seek to understand the strategies employed by these particular political
actors and their success factors. Key concepts in the study of lobbying
and other interest group activity include agenda-setting, advocacy
coalitions, framing, issue salience, and problem definition
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Baumgartner and Jones, 2015; Kingdon,
2010; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). In this article, however, we
propose that employing the ‘dimensions of power’ lens can provide a
unique insight into the relationship between lobbying, policy outcomes
and their relationships with socio-technical transitions. As well as re-
sponding to previous calls to use the ‘dimensions of power’ to consider
socio-technical transitions, we believe this approach also allows a wider
understanding of power that goes beyond lobbying.
There is a body of case studies describing lobbying on a wide array
of policy topics, but relatively few of these studies focus purely on the
energy policymaking process. Many of the notable contributions con-
cern EU energy policy processes (Boasson and Wettestad, 2013; Fitch-
Roy et al., 2019a, 2019b; Gullberg, 2015, 2013; 2008; Toke, 2008;
Ydersbond, 2018). The limitations of case-study research methods for
creating generalizable knowledge has recently led the discipline to-
wards the use of ‘large-n’ population studies in which quantitative
techniques such as text analysis are used to analyse many instances of
lobbying, across policy areas and contexts (e.g. Boräng et al., 2014;
Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014; Gray and Lowery, 1996; Klüver, 2013).
While 'large-n' approaches offers researchers the ability to control for
contextual factors to create generic understanding, they do not allow
the thick description required to explain a particular outcome – and its
implications for phenomena such as socio-technical transition - in de-
tail.
Despite the established importance of lobbying, we are unaware of
research that specifically investigates UK lobbying associated with en-
ergy. This article contributes to the literature on energy policy lobbying
and provides an original focus on the role of lobbying on UK energy
policy development.
4. Methodological approach
Attributing the agency of actors to cause policy change is complex
due to the various factors and actors at play in the policy process (John,
2012). There are three basic types of methodological approaches for
measuring the impact of actor lobbying on policy change, these are:
measured preference attainment, process tracing, and assessing attrib-
uted influence (Dür, 2008).
Here we employ an instrument combining the two latter ap-
proaches. In order to investigate policy changes associated with the
RHI, we make use of the ‘EAR’ instrument. This technique considers and
triangulates three perspectives associated with specific policy changes
overcoming some of the limits of relying on preference attainment and
attribution based methods (Arts and Verschuren, 1999). Firstly, it
considers the views of the lobbyists, key players who are involved with
or have knowledge of the influencing associated with the relevant
policy (‘ego’ or E). Secondly the views of relevant politicians or civil
servants with a knowledge of the specific policy development are
considered (‘alter’ or A). The approach also considers the view of the
researcher (R) on the particular policy change based on desk based
Fig. 4. The triangulation process for the analysis of lobbying based on the EAR instrument (Arts and Verschuren, 1999).
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research (Arts and Verschuren, 1999). The triangulation process then
compares the views of the egos, alters and the researcher to see where
views agree or diverge. Agreement among the three perspectives is
taken as evidence that a policy change has taken place and gives an
indication of whether or not power, influence or lobbying has caused
the observed change. A diagrammatic representation of the EAR in-
strument is shown in Fig. 4.
The use of the triangulation approach and the EAR instrument re-
quires relying on the view of those being lobbied, such as the civil
servants and politicians, in order to corroborate the views of lobbyists.
But it may be the case that none of the interviewees are entirely
forthcoming or that their reports are not entirely objective, over- or
under-stating their own or others' influence, either intentionally or
unintentionally (Beyers et al., 2014). While thorough, the requirement
of the EAR instrument for interviews with relevant ‘egos’, specific ‘al-
ters’ and access to relevant policy literature also increases complexity of
analysis and deliverability of results under the methodology (Arts and
Verschuren, 1999).
The importance of timing and the sequential order of events for the
ability of actors to influence policy is sometimes captured by the con-
cept of ‘policy windows’, particular moments in time when conditions
are conducive to policy change (Kingdon, 2010). The designers of the
‘EAR’ instrument also emphasise the importance the wider policy con-
text (Arts and Verschuren, 1999). The development of energy policy is
recognised as being particularly temporally contingent and contextual,
linked to relevant institutions and circumstances (Kuzemko et al.,
2016). Others have also argued that the position of actors in relation to
other actors can also be another important contextual factor (Geels,
2014). Process tracing allows particular attention to be paid to the
order of events relative to significant contextual changes. The analysis
of the RHI policy changes, while focusing on the role of actors will
therefore also consider how these contextual and structural factors have
affected the RHI's development.
The empirical data for this study is drawn from contemporary
documentary evidence and a series of 15 interviews carried out in 2015
with policymakers and other stakeholders. Policy change ‘episodes’ are
only included in the results of interviewees have highlighted that the
power of actors has been vital in causing policy change and the actual
policy change is apparent in grey literature. The EAR instrument is then
used to investigate power in each of these episodes.
5. Results: power and the renewable heat incentive
This section charts the development of the RHI through a series of
policy episodes. Results cite documentary evidence (author and year) or
interviews (numerical references). A list of interviewees is provided in
appendix A. Some interviews are anonymous and referenced as such.
We describe a number of key episodes in the development and
implementation of the RHI which were identified by interviewees as
having power as important to them. Each episode is considered in re-
lation to the three dimensions of power approach.
Fig. 5 shows a timeline of the policy episodes alongside other key
policy and political events. The following sub-sections chronologically
consider all of the significant episodes of policy change in the devel-
opment of the RHI between its inception and introduction in 2008 up to
2015.
5.1. Policy episode 1: the power of the Renewable Energy Association to
speed up the introduction of the RHI
Preliminary discussions within Government about renewable heat
took place around the same time that a new Energy Bill, focussed on
renewable electricity policies, was being scrutinised. Parliamentarians
and wider civil society supported the introduction of a Feed-In Tariff
(FIT) to promote small renewable electricity projects, something that
was absent from the draft Bill. This support was officially set down in an
Early Day Motion (a parliamentary tool designed to encourage debate)
tabled on the 5th February 2008 which had the support of 281 out of
650MPs (Parliament, 2008b).
In April 2008, Alan Simpson, the member of Parliament who laid
the Early Day Motion, along with a number of other MPs laid a po-
tential amendment to what would become the Energy Act 2008. This
amendment would have caused the Government to introduce a FIT
system which would have supported small scale electricity and heat.
This amendment was only narrowly defeated in a House of Commons
vote (representing a significant government rebellion) demonstrating
an unexpected level of support for small-scale renewable energy
(Guardian, 2008; Parliament, 2008b).
The Government was concerned that political support for the FIT
policy would eventually lead to a defeat in the Commons and took the
opportunity to amend the Bill, creating the electricity FIT and laying
the primary legislation for a Renewable Heat Incentive in the live Bill
(1). In the words of one interviewee, Parliament ‘forced the Government's
hand’ to create the legislation for the RHI (2).
Although the government introduced the amendment, the political
impetus for the RHI came from Parliament. However, the Renewable
Energy Association (REA), a trade body representing renewable energy
companies, explained that they believed that they, along with Friends
of the Earth, a non-governmental organisation, had been ‘instrumental’
in getting the amendment to the Bill (3) and this was also repeated by
Fig. 5. RHI policy episode timeline with key policy developments. Timing of policy episodes cannot be taken to be exact due to their complex nature.
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other former employees (4, 5) including their former chief executive,
who claimed that:
‘the whole of that Feed In Tariff and the RHI existence was the big win.
That was the first big goal.’ (4)
Another interviewee explained that a ‘Feed In Tariff campaign’ had
been led by non-governmental association Friends of the Earth and
involved the Renewable Energy Association, which was particularly
keen that the amendment included heat; this campaign had the support
of Alan Simpson MP (1).
Sources agree about the role of the REA in influencing the inclusion
of heat in the Energy Bill. Two civil servants working on the RHI be-
lieved that the REA played the leading role in campaigning for the RHI
(1, 6). One civil servant explained that ‘the REA drove the amendment
and everyone coalesced behind the REA’ (1). Another civil servant ex-
plained:
‘they were a big force certainly, even just to get the legislation in so she
(chief executive of REA) was a big force and I think probably on Feed In
Tariffs as well so I think …. the REA were the biggest sort of influence‘ (6).
While interviewees agree that the REA alongside Friends of the
Earth had played an important role, one source suggests that although
the campaign supported the RHI's development, the RHI would prob-
ably have happened anyway, it simply happened sooner (5). Indeed, a
civil servant stated that ‘we thought this is a fantastic opportunity to get
some primary legislation in around a renewable heat incentive’ (1). It is true
that the Government was already discussing support for renewable
heat. This implies that while the REA's push for the amendment was
successful, it simply sped up the process, highlighting the importance of
timing and context in this particular policy episode.
This episode demonstrates the action of the first dimension of
power. The REA appears to have induced the Government to do
something that they would not have otherwise done on the same
timescale. It also suggests the second dimension of power, the ability of
parliamentarians to put renewable heat on the agenda at an opportune
moment. The third dimension of power, the shaping of preferences can
also be observed, with the role of a ‘Feed-In Tariff campaign’ to cause
MPs to change their preferences and support change and amendment to
the Energy Act 2008.
5.2. Policy episode 2: funding the RHI through general taxation
In its ‘Renewable Energy Strategy’ white paper, the Government
initially suggested that the RHI would be funded through a levy on
fossil fuels, in much the same way that UK renewable electricity levies
are placed on electricity bills (HM Government, 2009). However, in
2010, following informal consultation with industry, the Government
announced that it was considering changing how it planned to fund the
scheme (DECC, 2010). It explained that the Government had met with
organisations that, if there were a levy on fossil fuels, would be liable
for the cost of the RHI. These problems included equitability concerns
around who would pay for the scheme, the transparency of scheme
costs and the complexity associated with administering it (DECC,
2010). There were questions about which fossil fuels would be subject
to the levy, with concerns raised about barbecue gas canisters and bags
of coal (1). There was also recognition that only placing the levy on
natural gas would penalise one of the lowest carbon sources of heat
available. However, precisely why change came about is not clear.
One off-grid fossil fuel company explained that:
‘We lobbied very hard that the RHI should come from general taxation,
not from a levy on fuel bills and it came from general taxation, how much we
had to do with that I don't know, but that was certainly our line’ (8).
Large energy companies were also unhappy with the levy idea. A
civil servant in DECC, explained that while the major energy companies
were generally supportive of the RHI:
‘ … off the record they would say we might stomach it [funding through
a levy on bills] for a while but eventually we will not, we will challenge you
because it just doesn't make sense that we get a levy on us' (6).
The fact that the RHI was funded through general taxation reflects
the preferences of the companies that sell fossil fuels both on and off the
gas grid. However, the use of triangulation does not suggest the fossil
fuel companies necessarily influenced the outcome and there is no
suggestion that on gas grid and off gas grid companies worked together
to attempt to reach this outcome. While, according to a former DECC
civil servant, lobbying from the fossil fuel sector was felt by DECC on
the issue, the government was concerned that funding the RHI through
energy suppliers would have been complex and long-winded, and that
funding it through taxation was simpler (1). This highlights an im-
portant contextual administrative factor that may have driven the
policy to be funded through taxation.
Despite a recognition of the role of power in this example by in-
terviewees, determining the role of power in this example is difficult.
Interview data between Egos (lobbyists) and Alters (actor being lob-
bied) cannot be corroborated and the limited grey literature on the
issue doesn't give any further detail (DECC, 2010). Uncorroborated civil
servant (alter) reports are treated with caution because civil servants
may not wish to appear as if other actors have successfully persuaded
them to change their policy position.
It is not clear what role power dynamics played in this episode.
Fossil fuel companies did, however, attempt to influence the
Government's position on the funding model.
5.3. Policy episode 3: the Mandarin and the near death of the RHI
Despite political and industry support, the existence of the required
laws and finances being available, one major obstacle to the RHI re-
mained, the most senior civil servant at the Department of Energy and
Climate Change. The ‘Permanent Secretary’ in DECC is both the head of
the department and ‘Accounting Officer’, accountable to Parliament for
spending (HM Treasury, 2015).
At the time of the introduction of the RHI, DECC's ‘Permanent
Secretary’ and ‘Accounting Officer’ was, according to two separate
DECC sources (both anonymous), personally opposed it. The most ne-
gative comments regarding the RHI came from within DECC following
an unexpectedly rapid take-up of solar photovoltaic panels. The con-
cern was that overspend on the Feed-In Tariffs for electricity, an em-
barrassment for the department, would be replicated in heat policy (1,
6, 9). The RHI policy was also recognised as being both a large item of
spend in general and an expensive way of reducing carbon emissions.
One civil servant explained:
‘it was designed purely to meet that 2020 [EU Renewable Energy]
target. If you were looking at something purely on low-carbon terms you
probably wouldn't have done it like that, in fact we wouldn't have done it like
that and it was hugely expensive, we knew that’ (anonymous).
At one point, the civil service considered relinquishing budgetary
responsibility (9). However, the request fo a ‘ministerial direction’3 was
never issued (9) and in February 2011, Chris Huhne pushed through the
non-domestic RHI, specifically excluding domestic scale systems, which
the policy impact assessment had deemed to offer poor value for money
(anonymous). As a compromise, the RHPP scheme was introduced
which offered limited capital grants for domestic renewable heat sys-
tems in advance of a potential domestic RHI.
This episode concerns administrative power dynamics rather than
the role of external interests but represents an important power struggle
in the development of the RHI. In this case, the ‘ego’ is the Permanent
Secretary, attempting (apparently successfully) to stop or slow the RHI
3 A ministerial direction requested by a permanent secretary passes financial
accountability for a Government decision onto the relevant minister (HM
Treasury, 2015). Two ministerial directions were requested between 2010 and
2015, making them an uncommon occurrence (Institute for Government,
2015).
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policy while the ‘alters’ are the department's own ministers. Full tri-
angulation in this case is not possible because of a lack of documentary
evidence associated with this internal Government power struggle and
because relevant ‘ego’ and ‘alter’ interviewees have not been available
for interviews; this highlights a known issue with the EAR instrument.
However, it appears, based on interviews with two separate civil ser-
vants that the permanent secretary did exercise power in reducing the
scale of the RHI by excluding domestic installations.
The permanent secretary deployed the first dimension of power to
force ministers to modify the RHI. However, although the permanent
secretary was able to have power, this was down to the formal authority
of her role; she was both in charge of the department and held re-
sponsibility for all DECC departmental spending. While we can ascribe
this policy change to the first dimension of power, it is important to
recognise the significance of the institutional context. The department's
experience of unplanned cost escalation in the electricity Feed-In Tariff
policy may also have increased the focus on cost effectiveness of the
RHI, highlighting the timing of this policy episode relative to other
policy developments.
5.4. Policy episode 4: the over-rewarding of biomass and heat pump in-
fighting in the domestic RHI
In 2013, DECC released details of the domestic RHI, to be launched
in spring 2014. The scheme would support biomass systems, air-source
heat-pumps (ASHP), ground and water-source heat pumps (GSHP) and
solar thermal with 7 year tariffs (DECC, 2013a).
As shown in Table 2, the domestic tariffs differed from those pro-
posed in the original consultation document. The changes, according to
Government, reflected cost information gathered from the Renewable
Heat Premium Payment grant, an existing policy, and new research.
The air-source heat pump tariff was lower than expected while the
biomass and solar thermal tariffs were higher (DECC, 2013a).
According to one interviewee from a ground source heat pump
(GSHP) manufacturer:
‘the Micro-Power Council (a trade association) were very, very sup-
portive of air-source [heat pumps] and were very cross with me when we
argued to DECC that this is a technology that could take off and you've got to
be careful about the tariff. And we knew we were on very fertile ground here,
DECC were so worried about budget that anyone saying the air-source in-
dustry could explode, it could be cheap Chinese kit …. DECC were going “oh
we can't have this, this is dreadful scenario” and they slashed the tariff’ (10).
The government's sensitivity to the risk of unanticipated cost esca-
lation based on recent experience of the Feed-In Tariff created a con-
cern that too high a tariff might trigger an expensive boom in heat
pump deployment. At least one trade association raised concerns about
the quality and performance of air source heat pumps, suggesting that
the RHI may over-reward them (5).
The lower air source heat pump tariff was seen as a success by some
(3, 10), particularly ground-source heat pump advocates, who claimed
a small victory (10) and believed they influenced policy in a way which
could be seen as the first face of power. However, the success was
qualified by a GSHP tariff set near the bottom of the proposed band. The
biomass tariff was also significantly higher than had been expected by
industry (see Table 2).
‘It was a policy success, but hurting them and not helping yourselves
[GSHP] was a fairly disappointing outcome’ (10, GSHP manufacturer).
According to the DECC impact assessment (DECC, 2013b), the tariff
changes were based on evidence gathered through research analysing
the Renewable Heat Premium Payment grant scheme led by consultants
‘sweett Group’ (sweett, 2013). There was no evidence that the biomass
tariff changed due to industry lobbying. The impact assessment stated:
‘There are some significant changes which have been made to the tariffs
most notably for net capital cost (Biomass is more expensive than previous
evidence suggested, ASHPs are slightly cheaper) and load factors [level of
use] … ’ (DECC, 2013b).
The costs information contained in the ‘sweett Group’ report was
based on responses to questionnaires completed by industry partici-
pants such as installers (sweett, 2013). This reliance on industry data is
an example of the power that industry actors can have when policy-
makers source information from actors with an interest in the policy
outcome. Information can be provided in support of the preferences of
provider. Nevertheless, despite the tariff changes, it is not possible to
attribute changes to the action of specific actors with the EAR instru-
ment in this case since there is no evidence from alters i.e. civil ser-
vants, that anyone successfully influenced the tariffs. In fact, one DECC
civil servant suggests that in the case of biomass:
‘they have been treated very generously by DECC with absurdly large
subsidies for biomass boilers which have been flooding in to dubious loca-
tions all around the country for many years now so I didn't see much lob-
bying from them because yeah they were just getting fat on the subsidies and
didn't need to lobby me’ (11).
Despite observable attempts to influence domestic RHI tariffs in this
episode, there is no clear evidence that any actors successfully did so. It
is possible that the industry was able, through strategically providing
cost information to the consultants, able to influence tariffs indirectly.
The provision of evidence could be seen as the first dimension of power
if as a result its deployment is causes policy makers to change. Evidence
could also be seen to be associated with the second dimension if it puts
ideas on the agenda or the third dimension if it shapes preferences or
views.
Interestingly, this episode shows that, even within the low-carbon
heat industry, power rivalries exist. In this case, it appears that conflict
between advocates of rival heating technologies may have led to a net
reduction in the overall financial support for the sector.
5.5. Policy episode 5: further support for biomass
In 2013, a change was introduced that significantly increased the
budget available to small and medium scale non-domestic biomass
boilers causing tariff levels to remain higher than they otherwise would
have been (DECC, 2013d).
The renewable energy industry and the government were engaged
in ‘quite a big feed-back loop’ (12), according to one civil servant at
DECC, and the REA took credit for influencing this budget re-allocation
(5, 3). The small number of officials involved in managing the alloca-
tion of budgets between technologies made this kind of change some-
thing of soft target for lobbying (5). However, a DECC economist
working on the RHI disputed this attribution of influence, citing un-
derspend on other technologies:
Table 2
Tariffs for technologies under the domestic RHI at 2012 consultation and then after the consultation at the introduction of the scheme (DECC, 2013b) N.B. for
comparisons between the final and proposed tariffs, use the numbers in bold; these figures represent the tariff paid on total heat output as opposed to actual tariffs
which are paid only on the ‘renewable’ proportion of heat (for heat pumps).
Biomass ASHP GSHP Solar Thermal
Tariff range proposed at consultation stage in 2012 (DECC, 2012b) (payable on total heat output) (pence/kWh) 5.2–8.7 6.9–11.5 12.5–17.3 17.3
Initial tariffs for scheme released in 2013 (pence/kWh) (equivalent to tariff payable on total heat output for comparison to row
above)
12.2 4.7 13.2 19.2
Actual initial tariffs (pence/kWh) 12.2 7.3 18.8 19.2
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‘it was a bit of a no brainer because at the time that we were making
those changes frankly it would've been inconceivable to not increase the
amount of money that was being given to biomass because otherwise we
would have been, as I said earlier, deciding that we weren't going to be
spending the money at all’ (12).
This change clearly benefitted the biomass industry and as can be
seen in Fig. 2, following this change which was introduced in early
2014, the number of biomass combustion installations under the RHI
increased rapidly. However, policymakers do not confirm the role of the
REA staff, who may have an increased belief in their own policy impact.
It may simply have happened without their input. It could however also
be the case that the civil servant, did not want to admit that the biomass
industry had successfully lobbied for this policy change and had exerted
power (the first face). Due to the lack of evidence that political power
successfully changed policy, understanding this policy change using the
dimensions framework is not possible.
5.6. Policy episode 6: extra support for biomethane
In 2014, perceived high subsidies for biomethane, biogas which is
upgraded and injected into the gas grid, led to a tariff review (DECC,
2014c). Biomethane was also subject to new rules for production sus-
tainability (DECC, 2013d).
A new tariff, set above the level proposed in the review was in-
troduced in February 2015 (DECC, 2015c). Since this date, the forecast
expenditure on biomethane has been above (in some cases more than
double) expected levels (BEIS, 2018b) suggesting that the new tariff has
had little effect on reducing the growth of biomethane. The new sus-
tainability rules were significantly less onerous than proposed in the
review, favouring the largely agricultural biomethane industry (3, 5,
13). According to one civil servant:
‘Biomethane is probably a good example where you've got some wealthy
landowners who are well connected with people in the House of Lords
and into the politicians and they can smooth the waters or at least make
the right phone calls or send the right notes. There was quite a lot of that
in that area … it was around all of the changes that we were thinking
about for biomethane, there was a lot of that background activity going
on … You would get messages coming down from ministerial offices and
thinking where did that come from? And those people obviously knew
how to go about doing that … I think in some cases it was the land
owners involved, the people who owned the project … I think it did ac-
tually help on the tariff setting, we did let them off fairly lightly in the end
on the tariffs. It could've been a lot worse. And the sustainability stuff we
did delay it for a long time, we did rethink on some of the numbers quite
a bit as a reaction to some of that lobbying.’ (14)
In the case of biomethane, the Government did not publish the re-
sponses to its consultations online (something it is not required to do
(Cabinet Office, 2016)) and there is little publicly available information
regarding this policy change. The Government response to the tariff
review in 2014 does list consultation respondees and explains that a
majority of respondees disagreed with some of the Government's cost
assumptions but gives no indication of who said what (DECC, 2014b).
However, the National Farmers Union (NFU), a trade association re-
presenting the farming industry and agricultural landowners, boasts on
its website that the guarantee of a biomethane tariff, fixed until De-
cember 2014, was a ‘policy-influencing ‘win’’ (NFU, 2014).
A letter from Greg Barker, Minister in DECC, to the Renewable
Energy Association and the Anaerobic Digestion and Biogas Association
argues that the changed tariff was due to ‘the volume of consultation
responses received and our (DECC's) wish to provide industry with more
certainty’ (DECC, 2014d). There is an implication that industry did in-
deed play a role in influencing DECC's decision. This appears to be an
example of industry causing Government to do something it would not
have otherwise done, the first dimension of power.
While the use of triangulation in this case suggests that industry was
successful in influencing biomethane support policy in a number of
ways, the lack of finely grained data makes understanding exactly why
these specific changes happened, and who caused them, opaque.
Responses to consultations, Government communications and other
materials suggest that those looking to influence the policy for bio-
methane were successful but, other than data from one interviewee,
there is nothing that proves that any particular actor had power to
change policy. While there is a specific correlation between the words
of an interviewee regarding landowners and a recognition from the
landowners that they have been successful, this does not indicate a
causal relationship.
This episode does, however, show that interviewees perceived these
wealthy land-owners with political connections as politically powerful,
having the ability to influence the policy process in a way that other
actors in the heat policy network could not.
6. Discussion
As well as exploring the role of the power of actors in the devel-
opment of the UK RHI, this article has highlighted the known com-
plexities of analysing power. Key theoretical and methodological con-
tributions are discussed in this section.
Our results indicate that the impact of actors’ power has been an
important factor in the development of the RHI, by speeding up the
introduction of the policy into law (episode 1), by slowing down the
implementation of the domestic scheme (episode 3) and by protecting
the biomethane sector (episode 6). We also describe episodes in which
socio-political power cannot be identified as a cause of change, sug-
gesting either that something else is causing policy change or the
methodology or our use of it is limited (potentially by the large gran-
ularity of analysis and the large number of policy episodes and issues
considered).
The policy episodes describe various approaches and attempts to
influence policy, including direct lobbying of parliamentarians, the use
of evidence and taking advantage of the known concerns of policy
makers. From the episodes, we have identified that policy change links
not just to actors but also to the institutional situation of actors which
can shape how power works and the wider context in which policy
development is taking place.
The episodes also highlight that the ability to affect policy change is
sometimes a case of ‘not what you know, but who you know’, with
landowners in particular enjoying access to ministers (episode 6). This
relationship appears to have influenced policy around biomethane in a
way that favours these well-connected interests, highlighting the im-
portance of the personal position of actors in the policy process.
We have also observed the importance of the historical policy
context and policy feedback in which earlier policy outcomes affect
future policy development (Béland, 2010; Lockwood et al., 2017).
Unexpectedly rapid deployment under the Feed-In Tariff led to risk
aversion within Government to demand based subsidy mechanisms
such as the RHI (episode 3). This example highlights the importance of
both the historical and institutional context in which power operates
within the policy process.
Much of the existing literature which has considered the role of
power in the development of policy for socio-technical transitions has
highlighted the importance of ‘incumbent’ actors. Surprisingly, in-
cumbents do not emerge from our analysis as a dominant force in the
development of the RHI. While incumbents have been involved, the
episodes emphasise the importance of small or niche actors who un-
derstand the policy and the technologies in detail, and can be nimble
and focused in their attempts to influence policy. The reliance of
Government on operational ‘evidence’ to develop polices which support
low-carbon heat systems also empowers the niche actors who possess,
or can credibly claim to possess, this information. Niche actors have
also had power through trade associations, which have been seen to be
heavily involved with the development of the RHI. The power of small
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and niche actors to promote transitions could therefore be an important
area for future research as niche actors may emerge as important lea-
ders in any potential transformation to low carbon heat in the UK. The
episodes also indicate that even within the niche-level, power rivalries
exist as actors aim to influence policy so that it suits their own specific
interests or technologies.
However, at current levels of deployment, the RHI does not re-
present a threat to the UK's gas based heat regime and the RHI may be
‘below the radar’ of gas and heat incumbents. It may be that as the UK's
ambition for a low-carbon heat transformation increases, so do chal-
lenges by incumbents and the more recent behaviour of UK heat sector
incumbents has been investigated elsewhere (Lowes et al., 2018).
Throughout the policy episodes, we have considered how the power
identified could be linked to Lukes' ‘dimensions of power’. We have
identified the first dimension appearing to have an impact in three of
the six episodes and have found that in all episodes actors have at-
tempted to have power over others (the first face). However, these at-
tempts and successes at causing policy change have been linked to
contextual factors such as, actors being in positions of institutional
authority, the role of evidence in policy design, previous policy ex-
periences and direct personal relationships. This highlights the com-
plexity of considering just one dimension of power and the importance
of considering the wider context in which power struggles take place.
The analysis has provided fewer observable examples of the second
and third dimensions of power and where we have observed these, the
first dimension has also been identified. We identify aspects of all three
dimensions in policy episode 1 with direct lobbying which caused MPs
to vote in a particular way (first), MPs having the ability to put heat on
the agenda using legislation (second), and the use of a campaign by
NGOs to shape the preferences and thoughts of MPs (linked to ideas of
the third dimension). We also observe elements of all three dimensions
in policy episode 4, actors have attempted to affect tariffs (first) but as
part of this, actors highlighted and played on Government concerns
around previous policy issues to affect policy outcomes which both
raised concerns onto the agenda (second face) and attempted to shape
the preferences and concerns of policy makers (third face). In both of
these examples, the different dimensions of power associated with
policy change are clearly linked highlighting complex links between the
dimensions of Lukes’ framework.
Overall, the ‘dimensions of power’ framework has provided a useful
lens through which power can be considered in the RHI policy process.
However this research has highlighted the requirement when using
Lukes' approach, of not just having to consider dimensions of power,
which are themselves contested and complex, but also to consider the
wider context of power and policy development. In light of this com-
plexity, we do see value in Lukes' approach, but believe narrative based
process tracing studies, alongside Lukes, which take into account wider
factors, can be key tools to unpick the role of power in the development
of potentially transformative policies.
The episodes have highlighted examples where full triangulation is
not possible due to grey data and interviewee access issues. Interviews
have also highlighted administrative power struggles which are not the
key analytical focus of the EAR instrument. While ‘grey’ data sources
such as policy documents may contain useful information, in some in-
stances, uncovering the reasons for policy change is not possible.
Recognising the EAR approach as a useful tool to consider power and
policy change, we believe the methodology could be strengthened by
opening it up to consider the influence of administration actors and by
using a further round of research which includes more finely grained
policy analysis such as data gained through requests under the UK's
Freedom of Information Act (2000) (or smilar public transparency
legislation elsewhere) and further interviews. These approach may of
course be constrained by the availability of time and therefore, in-
vestigating power requires careful attention to be paid to the avail-
ability of data and research timescales.
7. Conclusions and policy implications
We have used the EAR methodology to explore power and policy
influence on the development of GB RHI and identified policy changes
have been considered using Lukes’ three dimensional power frame-
work. We have provided a thick description of the development of a
specific energy policy linked to the power of actors. More specifically,
we set out to address three questions:
1. How has the RHI been affected by socio-political power?
2. How have actors attempted to influence the RHI?
3. What are the implications of this influence for the GB transforma-
tion to low-carbon heating?
We have shown that the GB RHI has been affected by the power of
actors. Niche actors sped up the introduction of the scheme and have
also had some success in increasing relative support for biomethane
injection. We have also highlighted that the power to influence the RHI
has not just been associated with heat industry actors; a senior
Government bureaucrat also appears to have had significant power to
affect the fundamental shape of the RHI policy. Attempts to influence
by external interests from the heat industry include direct engagement
with policy makers, the provision of data to policy makers, using per-
sonal connections with the legislature, and media engagement. These
approaches also often link to the wider policy context and tend to be
concentrated in relevant institutional foci.
As well as providing an important contribution to the literature on
energy policy change, this analysis also contributes to literature fo-
cusing on power associated and socio-technical transitions. While much
of the focus on power in the transitions field has emphasised the role of
incumbents, we have shown in this example, the power of niche actors
and others to influence policy. Understandings of the power of actors
must therefore move beyond simple belief that incumbents are they key
political actors. As important as they may be, other interested actors
can affect policy change.
7.1. Implications for policy
Overall, the level of dominance of bioenergy based technologies
within the non-domestic RHI was originally unanticipated and we have
identified significant lobbying pressure to support bioenergy under the
scheme. While lobbying by bioenergy interests does not appear suc-
cessful in all policy episodes, some success has been recorded. Further
investigations into the power of the bioenergy lobby and the implica-
tions of this power on energy system change could have merit.
While the domestic RHI scheme is now delivering a reduced pro-
portion of biomass systems, in the non-domestic scheme, while total
deployment levels have reduced, even in light of recent policy changes
to increase the support for non-bioenergy technologies, bioenergy still
dominates the scheme. This is concerning not just because it was not
anticipated but because of general uncertainties over bioenergy sour-
cing and sustainability. Specific policy implications highlighted by this
analysis are considered below:
1. The importance of policy maker access to reliable data or ‘evidence’
has been highlighted by this research which has highlighted a near
total reliance on vested interests to provide data on which the RHI
has been based. Administrations either need to provide necessary
resources to allow the collation of more reliable data for policy
making (including a better understanding of the interests behind
that data) or accept that the reliance on unfiltered industry data will
impact on policy outcomes as has happened within the RHI.
2. The UK's ‘lobbying act’ (HM Government, 2015) described in section 1 is
inadequate and could be strengthened. This case study has clearly
identified non-government actors attempting to lobby. However, under
the Lobbying Act, none of the lobbying practice would have been
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recorded because registration of in-house lobbyists is not required under
the act and because actual lobbying activities are not recorded (Office of
the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists, 2017). The lobbying highlighted
in this case study remains as opaque as it would have been if the Lob-
bying Act had not been implemented.
3. Policy influencing behaviours have real world impacts and can
therefore be a significant element of energy system change. The
impacts of successful lobbying recorded here are extremely likely to
have affected the volume and type of renewable heat delivered by
UK energy policy, compared to a counterfactual in which the policy
influencing had not taken place. In this case study that includes:
i. An increase in the total amount of renewable heat delivered in
the UK by the acceleration of the delivery of the RHI legislation
identified in episode 1.
ii. A reduction in the amount of domestic renewable heat produced
at a domestic level caused by the slowing of the implementation
of the domestic scheme identified in episode 3.
iii. An increase in the proportion of biomethane delivered by the
scheme and a reduction in the carbon savings associated with
each unit of biomethane as a result of changes described in
policy episode 6.
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Appendix A. List of Interviewees with dates of interview and type
of organisation
1. DECC Civil Servant – 11/08/15 – Civil Service.
2. Ground Source Heat Pumps Association representative - 13/10/
15 – Trade Association.
3. Renewable Energy Association head of policy - 19/05/15 – Trade
Association.
4. Renewable Energy Association ex-chief executive – 3/04/15 –
Trade Association.
5. Renewable Energy Association employee – 20/05/15 – Trade
Association.
6. DECC civil servant – 12/08/15 – Civil Service.
7. Sustainable Energy Association chief executive - 10/07/15 –
Trade Association.
8. Anonymous – 16/06/15.
9. Anonymous – 12/08/15.
10. Kensa Heat Pumps chief executive – 05/05/15 – Heat Pump
Company.
11. DECC ex-chief scientist – 05/11/15 – Civil service.
12. DECC civil servant – 12/08/15 – Civil service.
13. Anaerobic Digestion and Bioresources Association head of policy
– 20/05/15 – Trade Association.
14. DECC civil servant – 06/08/15 – Civil Service.
15. SSE employee – 05/06/15 – Energy Company.
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